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COMMENTS
WE MAY YET HAVE A QUIET
ENVIRONMENT: THE NEW CALIFORNIA
AIRPORT NOISE REGULATIONS
The high-pitch scream of a jet passing a few hundred feet
overhead has caused a great number of people to despair over the
advance in our space technology.1 Noise from our major airports
has made normal living impossible in areas as far as five miles
from an airport.2 Within these areas airport noise not only dis-
rupts conversation, sleep, and education,3 but also reduces property
values.' In an attempt to compensate for this interference with
living habits, residences, schools, churches, hospitals, and all other
uses entitled to reasonable peace must be insulated against noise.'
Consequently, aircraft noise has recently been classified as the
number one problem facing civil aviation.6 Unfortunately, existing
legal principles applicable to the airport noise problem contribute
very little, if at all, to its solution.7 Recognizing the weaknesses in
the current law, the California Department of Aeronautics (here-
inafter referred to as DOA) recently adopted Airport Noise Regula-
tions' (hereinafter referred to as Regulations) which represent the
strongest effort yet to abate airport noise. This comment analyzes
existing law and the Regulations as they relate to airport noise.
COMMON LAW METHODS OF AIRPORT NOISE ABATEMENT
Prior to the adoption of the Regulations, California residents
had to look to the common law for protection against undesirable
noise. Property owners employed two common law doctrines in an
1 "A few years ago it was a popular pastime to visit airports and to watch aircraft
operations. Today, as a result of noise . . . airports are considered bad neighbors and
their growth is often opposed." DOT-N,%sA, CiviL AVIATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-
MENT POLICY STUDY 2-4 (1971).
2 Berger, Nobody Loves An Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631, 737 (1970).
3 DOT-NASA, CIVIL AVIATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY STUDY 5-3
(1971). As an example of the degree of disruption airport noise may cause, the authors
note that the area affected by excessive noise around the John F. Kennedy Airport in
New York includes 35,000 dwellings, 22 public schools, and several dozen churches
and clubs.
4 Berger, Nobody Loves An Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631, 665-78 (1970).
5 Id. at 737.
6 DOT-NASA, CIVIL AVIATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY STUDY 2-4,
2-6, 5-3 (1971).
7 See notes 9-39 and accompanying text, infra.
8 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE §§ 5000-5080.5 (1970).
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attempt to protect their interests, inverse condemnation and nui-
sance. However, as noise abatement techniques, these tools pro-
vide little hope to persons living in the vicinity of airports who
desire to reside in a quiet, peaceful environment.
Inverse Condemnation
Inverse condemnation may provide a remedy to individuals
for damages to property caused by airport interference. In order
for this cause of action to succeed, there must be a taking of private
property for public use in violation of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution. ° In the federal courts and a majority
of the state courts, a "taking" has been found to exist in two
situations. One is where there are low and frequent flights of air-
craft directly over a person's property which cause interference so
substantial as to deprive the owner of the practical enjoyment of his
property and reduce its fair market value." The other type of
"taking" occurs when the noise and vibrations from lateral flights
are so great as to make the property uninhabitable. 2 Therefore, in
jurisdictions which support the majority view, noise absent overflight
will result in a "taking" only when the noise causes a total impair-
ment of the property's utility;" whereas in the overflight situation,
a court merely has to determine that the noise from the overflights
diminishes the property's fair market value.
Application of this distinction works an inconsistent and un-
just result in specific situations. For example, where the noise of
aircraft flying directly overhead reduces the fair market value of
the property, a court will find a "taking." However, where noise
of aircraft flying over land adjacent to the same piece of property
creates a similar decrease in its fair market value but does not
totally impair its utility, a court will not find a "taking." Because
the damage in both situations is exactly the same, the results reached
by the courts are inconsistent.
Recognizing this problem of inconsistency and relying on the
position taken by courts in other jurisdictions,14 a recent Califor-
9 For an extensive discussion of inverse condemnation and nuisance suits as air-
port noise abatement methods see Berger and Fadem, A Noisy Airport Is A Damned
Nuisance, 3 Sw. U.L. REV. 39 (1971); and Comment, The Jet Set and the Law: De-
velopments in Aircraft Noise Law in California, 1 PAcIFIc L.J. 581 (1970).
10 "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
12 Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
'a Id. at 585.
14 Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966) ; Martin v.
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nia case, Nestle v. City of Santa Monica,'5 held that aircraft noise
resulting from either direct overflights or lateral flights will cause
a "taking" where the noise diminishes the fair market value of the
property."0 The plaintiffs in Nestle sought damages from Santa
Monica Municipal Airport as a result of the noise produced by air-
craft traversing land adjacent to the plaintiff's property. 7 The
federal requirements for a cause of action--direct overflights or
total impairment of the property's utility-were noted.' 8 However,
the court rejected the claim that this was the proper law to apply.'9
Instead, the court followed the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Oregon in the case of Thornburg v. Port of Portland,0 where it
was stated:
The proper test to determine whether there has been a compensable in-
vasion of the individual's property rights ... is whether the interference
with use and enjoyment is sufficiently direct, sufficiently peculiar, and
of sufficient magnitude to support a conclusion that the interference
has reduced the fair market value of the plaintiff's land by a sum cer-
tain of money.21
In adopting this test as the law to apply in inverse condemnation
suits arising out of aircraft noise, the court in Nestle has set a
precedent for California courts. Since the holding resolves the in-
consistency that exists in federal law, it represents a welcome change
in California's law of inverse condemnation.
Despite California's more liberal approach to inverse con-
demnation actions based on noise considerations, this doctrine re-
mains an ineffective legal principle to apply towards airport noise
abatement. Proving a "taking" merely allows an after-the-fact re-
covery for damage done. It does nothing to prevent airport noise
levels from increasing. That is, where the fair market value of a
person's property has been diminished due to noise from airport
operations, he may bring suit in inverse condemnation and recover
the difference between the actual value of his property and the fair
market value. However, his recovery does not preclude airports
from increasing their operational noise levels and thereby inflicting
greater property damage in the future.
Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989
(1965); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960). All of
these courts held there could be a taking of property due to noise despite the absence
of overflights where the noise diminished the fair market value of the property.
15 19 Cal. App. 3d 869, 97 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1971).
16 Id. at 880-82, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 242-43.
17 Id. at 877-79, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
18 Id. at 879-80, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41.
19 Id. at 879-82, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 241-43.
20 244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966).
21 Id. at 71, 415 P.2d at 752. . :r
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Nuisance
The California legislature defines nuisance as "[alnything
which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses,
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property ... ,22 This definition
may be sufficient for the vast majority of airports to qualify as
nuisances to nearby property owners. However, California rejects
the nuisance theory as a basis for recovering damages against a
publicly-owned airport even though the noise of that airport's opera-
tions may unreasonably interfere with a person's enjoyment of his
property.28 In defense of this rejection, the courts24 rely on Califor-
nia Government Code Section 815 which states,"[A] public entity
is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act
or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other
person... ,2
Notwithstanding the governmental immunity from damages,
airport operations may be enjoined pursuant to California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 731(a)2" which provides that airport opera-
tions may be deemed a nuisance and enjoined when they are proven
to be "unnecessary and injurious methods of operation.1 27 In Loma
Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc.,28 the California Su-
preme Court held that airport operations will not be found to be
"unnecessary and injurious" under Section 731(a) unless they are
imminently dangerous and inconsistent with the public interest
which supports the continuation of such operations. 29 To date there
are no reported cases which have made this necessary finding. How-
ever, the court cited Anderson v. Souza30 as standing for the propo-
sition that an injunction will issue in certain limited circumstances
22 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West. 1970).
23 Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 19 Cal. App. 3d 869, 97 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1971).
24 Id.
25 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West. 1966).
28 "Whenever any city, city and county, or county shall have established zones
or districts under authority of law wherein certain manufacturing or commercial or
airport uses are expressly permitted, except in an action to abate a public nuisance
brought in the name of the people of the State of California, no person or persons, firm
or corporation shall be enjoined or restrained by the injunctive process from the
reasonable and necessary operation in any such industrial or commercial zone or air-
port of any use expressly permitted therein, nor shall such use be deemed a nuisance
without evidence of the employment of unnecessary and injurious methods of opera-
tion. Nothing in this act shall be deemed to apply to the regulation and working hours
of canneries, fertilizing plants, refineries and other similar establishments whose opera-
tion produce offensive odors." CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 731(a) (West 1955).
27 Id.
28 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
29 Id. at 590, 394 P.2d at 553, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
30 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952).
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absent a showing of "unnecessary and injurious operations."'' In
Souza the court held that an airport's operations could be enjoined
where such operations created a nuisance in the surrounding com-
munity."2 The findings showed that the noise had destroyed the
peace of the adjacent homes making it impossible to get adequate
sleep, drowning out normal conversation, and making it impossible
to use the radio or the telephone.3 ' The Souza court qualified its
holding by noting that it applied only to a privately-owned airport,
the establishment of which required no finding by a public agency
as to public necessity.34
The Loma Portal case involved a public airport, and the court
determined that the airport's operations could not be deemed an
enjoinable nuisance unless the operations were proven "unnecessary
and injurious." 3  This represents a higher degree of proof than re-
quired in Souza. 6 However, despite the divergent results in the
two cases, the Loma Portal court found its holding consistent with
Souza on the ground that Souza involved a private airport whereas
Loma Portal involved a public airport, the establishment of which
required a finding of public necessity.37
In September, 1968, the California Public Utilities Code was
amended3" so that both public and private airports are subject to
the same statutory requirements before the DOA will issue operating
permits.3" Therefore, subsequent to this date, the holding of Loma
Portal applies in all actions seeking to enjoin airport operations,
whether the airport involved is public or private. Due to the un-
willingness of the courts to find airport operations "unnecessary
and injurious," it appears futile to attempt to enjoin airport opera-
tions in the future.
THE CALIFORNIA AIRPORT NOISE REGULATIONS
Recognizing the inadequacies in the common law methods of
noise abatement, the DOA adopted the Regulations as a statutory
attack on the problem. The Regulations represent an effort to pro-
vide uniform controls for airport noise abatement by establishing
81 61 Cal. 2d at 590, 394 P.2d at 553, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
32 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952).
83 Id. at 829-830, 243 P.2d at 500.
34 Id. at 848, 243 P.2d at 508.
85 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
38 Cf. 38 Cal. 2d at 829, 243 P.2d at 500.
37 61 Cal. 2d at 590, 394 P.2d at 553, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
88 Cal. Stats., 1968, ch. 791, § 2, at 1535 (1968), amending, Cal. Stats., 1953,
ch. 151, § 1, at 939 (1953) (Codified at CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 21661 (West. 1965)).
89 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21661-66 (West. Supp. 1971).
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a plan to reduce the noise at California airports to a tolerable
level by 1985.40
General Provisions
The methods outlined in the Regulations for measuring air-
port noise levels4 involve two basic types of measuring units-the
40 Title 4, CAL. ADm. CODE §§ 5000-5080.5 (1970).
41 The scale to be used under the California Regulations for the measurement
of noise levels is the decibel scale, a practical application of which is as follows:
Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An Introduction to the Problem and An Outline for
Various Sounds in Decibels
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Hourly Noise Level 2 (hereinafter referred to as HNL) measuring
units 3 and the single event noise limit" units.45 The former are
designed to measure the noise level for all airport operations during
each hour of the day46 while the latter measure the noise of each
aircraft as it takes off or lands.4"
The airport noise level criteria subject to measurement by
HNL units are stated as follows:
Limitations on airport noise in residential communities are hereby
established:
(a) The criterion community noise equivalent level 48 is 65 decibels
for proposed new airports and for vacated military airports being
converted to civilian use.
(b) Giving due consideration to economic and technological feasibility,
the criterion community noise equivalent level for existing airports (ex-
cept as follows) is 70 decibels until December 31, 1985, and 65 decibels
thereafter.
(c) The criterion CNEL for airports which have 4-engine turbojet or
Future Legal Research, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 652, 670 (1970). For an extensive dis-
cussion of other types of scales usable see Berger, Nobody Loves An Airport, 43 S.
CAL. L. REV. 631 (1970) ; Larsen, Improving the Airport Environment: Effect of the
1969 FAA Regulations on Noise, 55 IOWA L. REv. 808 (1970).
42 "The hourly noise level, in decibels, is the average (on an energy basis) noise
level during a particular hour. Hourly noise level is determind by subtracting 35.6
decibels equal to 10 loglo 3600 from the noise exposure level measured during the
particular hour, integrating for those periods during which the noise level exceeds a
threshold noise level." Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5006(e) (1970).
43 "The HNL monitoring system shall measure the hourly noise level and shall
provide identification of the hour. This system shall be deployed as a community
monitoring system. An HNL system consists of two subsystems: a noise level sub-
system and an integrator/logger subsystem." Id. § 5080.1(d).
44 "The single event noise exposure level, in decibles, is the noise exposure level
of a single event, such as an aircraft flyby, measured over the time interval between
the initial and final times for which the noise level of a single event exceeds the
threshold noise level . . . ." Id. § 5006(d).
45 "The SENEL monitoring system shall measure single event noise exposure
levels exceeding the maximum allowable single event noise exposure level and shall log
the time of occurrence of each such event. An SENEL system consists of two sub-
systems: a noise level subsystem and an integrator/logger subsystem." Id. § 5080.1(c).
46 Id. § 5080.1(d).
47 Id. §§ 5035, 5080.1(c) (1970).
48 The Community Noise Equivalent Level is the acoustic scale used by the
DOA in setting the noise criteria. It takes into account all the elements that combine
to form the total aircraft noise environment around an airport. These elements are
the magnitude and duration of noise from each aircraft flyby, number of flybys, and
time of occurrence. The Regulations define CNEL as follows:
"Community noise equivalent level, in decibels, represents the average
daytime noise level during a twenty-four hour day, adjusted to an equivalent
level to account for the lower tolerance of people to noise during evening
and night time periods relative to the daytime period. Community noise
equivalent level is calculated from hourly noise levels by the following:
CNEL = 10 log I antilog H
24 L10
HNLE HNLNI
+ 3 1 antilog 0 + 10 2 antilog - J10 1
Where
HNLD are the hourly noise levels for the period 0700-1900 hours;
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turbofan air carrier aircraft operations and at least 25,000 annual air
carrier operations (takeoffs plus landings) is as follows:
Date CNEL (in dB)
Effective date of regulations48 a
to 12-31-75 80
1-1-76 to 12-31-80 75
1-1-81 to 12-31-85 70
1-1-86 and thereafter 6549
These standards represent the average of all the hourly noise levels
over each twenty-four hour period. If at the end of a twenty-four
hour period any residential area is affected by an airport noise level
above the criterion level, then the airport is in violation of the
Regulations.
The timetable noted above allows an airport proprietor to
progressively reduce the noise level at his airport so that it reaches
the tolerable level of 65 decibels by 1985. The DOA considered
65 decibels as the ultimately desired noise level by determining,
pursuant to its authority under the enabling legislation,5 ° that this
level is acceptable to the reasonable man living within the vicinity
of an airport.5 1 Sixty-five decibels does appear to be a reasonable
level as it is comparable to the sound produced by normal conversa-
tion.52 In deeming it the desired level, the DOA considered many
factors. Two of the more important ones were the adverse effect
of noisy airports on the living habits of persons in surrounding com-
munities and the fact that many individuals and organized citizen
groups have complained about airport noise.53 Studies of these
many and varied complaints indicated that the severity of each
complaint was associated principally with a combination of the
magnitude and duration of the noise from aircraft operations, the
number of aircraft operations, and the time of occurrence. 4
Implementation
The Regulations are designed to achieve airport noise abate-
ment through the efforts of the airport proprietor working in
conjunction with local governments, local land use commissions,
aircraft operators, pilots, and the DOA.55 However, the airport
HNLE are the hourly noise levels for the period 1900-2200 hours;
HNLN are the hourly noise levels for the period 2200-0700 hours;
and I means summation." Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5006(f) (1970).
48a The noise criteria under the regulations have been designated effective Dec. 1,
1972. Cal. Stats., 1971, ch. 1734, to be codified in Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 21669.3.
49 Id. § 5012 (1970).
50 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21669 (West Supp. 1971).
51 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5005 (1970).
52 See note 41, supra.
53 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5005 (1970).
54 Id.
55 Id. § 5000 (1970).
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proprietor is ultimately responsible for complying with the noise
level criteria.56 In order to bring his airport within the required
noise levels, the proprietor may do any or all of the following:
1) Encourage use of the airport by the least noisy aircraft and
discourage its use by others; 2) Encourage the least noisy approach
and departure flight paths; 3) Plan the least noisy runway utiliza-
tion schedules; 4) Reduce flight frequency of the noisier aircraft
during the most noise sensitive time periods; 5) Employ shielding
through use of natural terrain, buildings, and other available de-
vices; and 6) Develop compatible land use within the areas around
the airport affected by noise levels greater than those allowable
under the Regulations."
An additional method, which is not optional but must be
implemented by the airport proprietor, is the selection of single
event noise limits.5" That is, the airport proprietor must select
noise limits representing the maximum noise levels which aircraft
landings and takeoffs may generate. The airport proprietor must
select these limits from a range designated permissible by the
DOA.59 Upon approval by the DOA, the limits selected by the air-
port proprietor are enforceable by the county, and individual air-
craft operators who violate them are subject to a $1,000 fine per
violation.60 Thus, although the airport proprietor is responsible for
bringing his airport within the ambient noise level criteria for all
operations, the aircraft operators are responsible for complying
with the takeoff and landing noise limits.
The provisions in the Regulations designed to establish moni-
toring programs became effective November 30, 1 9 7 1.16a Counties
have six months from this date to determine whether a particular
airport has a noise problem.6 In making this determination, the
county must perform the following functions:
(1) Investigate the possible existence of a noise impact area greater
than zero based on a community noise equivalent level of 70 decibels,
56 Id. §§ 5060-64.
57 Id. § 5011. Concerning the constitutional validity of compatible land use zon-
ing, see Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710
(1967); and Smith v. County of Santa Barbara, 243 Cal. App. 2d 126, 52 Cal. Rptr.
292 (1966). Both of these courts found the development of compatible land use within
the areas surrounding an airport to be a constitutionally valid objective of zoning.
As to the constitutional validity of the other noise abatement methods, see notes
111-81 and accompanying text, infra.
58 Title 4, CAL. ADm. CODE § 5035 (1970).
59 Id.
60 Id. § 5055, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21669.4 (West Supp. 1971).
60a Cal. Stats., 1971, ch. 1734, to be codified in Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 21669.3.
61 Title 4, CAL. Am. CODE § 5070(a) (1970).
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and determine whether or not people actually reside inside the noise
impact boundary;
62
(2) Review other information that it may deem relevant, including
but not limited to complaint history and legal actions brought about by
aircraft noise; and
(3) Coordinate with, and give due consideration to the recommenda-
tions of, the county airport land use commission.
6 3
When a county makes its determination with respect to the existence
of a noise problem at a particular airport, any interested or affected
person 64 or any governmental agency disagreeing with the county's
findings may file an appeal with the DOA. 5 The DOA must con-
duct its own investigation and report its conclusions to the parties
involved.66 If the parties disagree with these conclusions, they have
ten days to demand a hearing from the DOA. The DOA must then
conduct the necessary hearing pursuant to the California Admin-
istrative Procedure Act."7 Following a final determination by the
DOA that a particular airport is operating in violation of the Regu-
lations, the proprietor must seek a temporary variance and initiate
the proper noise monitoring procedures.6 That is, both the variance
procedure and the requirement for initiation of monitoring are de-
layed until the DOA reaches a conclusive determination as to
whether a noise problem exists.69
The airport proprietor, in initiating the monitoring, will place
single event noise limit measuring units at each end of his air-
port's runways for the monitoring of noise levels for each aircraft
takeoff and landing.7" He will also locate HNL units around his
airport for the measurement of the operational noise level of the
airport. However, before doing the latter he must determine a noise
impact boundary 7' for his airport. This boundary will surround
62 This means that the county will check to see if any residences around the
airport are actually affected by noise levels greater than 70 decibels. For a discussion
of how noise impact boundaries and areas are designated see notes 71-74 and ac-
companying text, infra.
63 Title 4, CAL. ADm. CODE § 5050(b) (1970).
64 Just what the phrase "interested or affected persons" means is unclear. The
fact that the phrase includes both the words "interested" and "affected" could mean
that appeal is allowed not only by people living within the vicinity of the airport but
also by people living outside the vicinity who are interested in protecting the environ-
ment from excessive noise. In any event it is clear that a person or group need not be
both "interested" and "affected." For further discussion of this point see notes 108-10
and accompanying text, infra.
65 Title 4, CAL. Aim. CODE § 5050(C) (1970).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. § 5070(b).
69 Telephone interview with Richard Dyer, Program Manager for Noise Level
Control, Cal. Dep't of Aeronautics, Aug. 15, 1971.
70 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5031 (1970).
71 Id. §§ 5020-25.
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the area in the vicinity of an airport affected by airport noise levels
greater than the criteria permit.7 The airport proprietor will be
primarily concerned with residential areas73 within the noise impact
boundary. He must reduce his airport noise level to the extent
where it no longer subjects residences to improper noise levels.
Once a noise impact boundary is established, the HNL monitoring
units will be located along its perimeter at a minimum of twelve
equidistant points.
74
The Variance Procedure76
An airport proprietor may request that his airport be allowed
to temporarily violate the noise criteria.76 In his application to the
DOA, he must set forth reasons why a variance is necessary, the
future date by which he expects to comply with the Regulations,
and a schedule of noise level reductions for the intervening time.77
The DOA may grant a variance if the public interest would
be satisfied by so doing.78 In making this decision the DOA must
weigh certain factors including the following: 1) the economic and
technological feasibility of complying with the Regulations; 2) the
noise impact should the variance be granted; 3) the value to the
public of the services for which the variance is sought; and 4)
whether the airport proprietor is making a bona fide effort to comply
with the Regulations.79 The DOA, after balancing these factors,
will grant a variance only if such action would be consistent with
the general welfare of the community wherein the airport is
located.
Although the above facts indicate that the DOA has a tremen-
dous amount of discretion in determining whether it will grant a
variance, the latitude of its discretion is no wider than that of other
72 Id. § 5006(h).
73 Id. § 5014(h). This provision indicates that residential areas will be determined
by the actual use to which the land is put, not by the classification for which the
land is zoned.
74 Id. § 5021.
75 Id. § 5075.
76 "The variance procedure under the California Regulations states that an air-
port proprietor may not request a variance from the requirements of the noise criteria.
This means that an airport proprietor may not request that the noise criteria be
changed for his airport. However, it does not mean that an airport proprietor cannot
request that his airport be allowed to temporarily violate the criteria. An airport
proprietor may request to operate his airport above the criterion levels temporarily if
he shows sufficient hardship as required by the variance procedure." Telephone inter-
view with Richard Dyer, Program Manager for Noise Level Control, Cal. Dep't
Aeronautics, Aug. 15, 1971.
77 Title 4, CAL. ADa. CODE § 5075(b)(3) (1970).
78 Id. § 5075(b)(4).
79 Id.
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administrative agencies. An example of such an agency is a zoning
board whose duty it is to determine the land uses which are the
most advantageous to the community and grant variances only when
consistent with the general welfare of the community.8 ° As is the
case with zoning boards, the DOA could possibly be subject to
suit if the variance were granted over objections strenuous enough
to require its denial. By granting a variance in this situation, the
action of the DOA would be very similar to a zoning board's action
in arbitrarily granting a variance without giving sufficient consider-
ation to the general welfare of the community. Such action by
zoning boards has traditionally been invalidated by the courts.8
Therefore, if the DOA acts without giving sufficient consideration
to a community's welfare, it is reasonable to expect that its action
may be invalidated. 2
Assuming the DOA deems a person interested or affected, to
what extent may he become involved in the variance procedure?
According to the Regulations, "On its own motion, or upon the re-
quest of an affected or interested person, the department shall hold
a public hearing in connection with the approval of an application
for a variance. Any interested person may obtain from the depart-
ment information on pending requests for variances at any time."83
Thus, the type of hearing available to interested persons under the
variance procedure is merely a "public hearing" at which they
would be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. This is not
the same as the formal hearing pursuant to the California Admin-
istrative Procedure Act 4 which is available to interested persons
80 Essick v. Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 614, 213 P.2d 492 (1950) ; Minney v. Ayusa,
164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959)
L & M Investment Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 180 N.E. 379 (1932).
81 Moriarty v. Pozner, 21 N.J. 199, 121 A.2d 527 (1956) ; Ranney v. Instituto
Pontifico Delle Maestre Filippini, 20 N.J. 189, 119 A.2d 142 (1955).
82 Concerning what type of interest one must possess to obtain standing to sue
on an environmental issue, the U.S. Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970), declared:
That interest, at times, may reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and recre-
ational" as well as economic values. [Citations omitted]. We mention these
noneconomic values to emphasize that standing may stem from them as well
as from the economic injury on which petitioners rely here.
However, the 9th Circuit believes that standing may be won only upon a showing
of sufficient actual economic interest. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 907 (1971) sub. nom. Sierra Club v. Morton. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve the issue of standing to sue
in cases involving the environment. For a thorough analysis of this standing issue see
Comment, Standing and Sovereign Immunity: Hurdles for Environmental Litigants,
12 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 122 (1971).
83 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5075(b)(6) (1970).
84 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11370 et seq. (West 1966).
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appealing a county's determination as to the existence of a noise
problem at an airport."5
Enforcement
The fact that the Regulations require that by 1985 no residence
be affected by an airport noise level greater than the level of normal
conversation, 65 decibels, indicates the potential strength of the
Regulations. Nevertheless, the Regulations would be useless in the
absence of effective enforcement. Presently, there are two methods
of enforcement specified in the Regulations. Individual violators
of the single event noise limits may be fined up to $1,000 per viola-
tion."6 This would undoubtedly deter aircraft operators from future
violations of the single event limits. The operational noise criteria,
on the other hand, are not supported by an equally effective enforce-
ment technique. The only method available for enforcement of the
noise criteria is for the DOA to lift the license of an airport found
in violation of the criteria.87 This technique presents practical as
well as constitutional problems which are discussed in the following
sections.88
Summary
The California Regulations represent a strong effort to regulate
airport noise, and this is something that neither inverse condem-
nation nor nuisance suits have been able to acomplish. However,
before a conclusion may be reached as to the potential effectiveness
of the Regulations, there are certain practical difficulties and con-
stitutional issues which must be resolved.
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
The Regulations Prohibit Use of Noise
Criteria in Civil Litigation
One problem concerns the provision in the Regulations which
proscribes application of the noise criteria in civil litigation arising
out of airport noise:
The Regulations established by this subchapter are not intended to set
noise levels applicable in litigation arising out of claims for damages
occasioned by noise. Nothing herein contained in these regulations
85 Id. § 5050(c).
86 C.AL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21669.4 (West Supp. 1971).
87 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21668 (West Supp. 1971).
88 See notes 97-107, 171-76 and accompanying text, infra.
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shall be construed to prescribe a duty of care in favor of, or to create
any evidentiary presumption for use by, any person or entity other
than the State of California, the counties and airport proprietors in the
enforcement of the regulations.8 9
This provision is designed to protect airports and airlines from
inverse condemnation and nuisance suits by individuals claiming
their properties have been damaged by airport noise levels greater
than those allowable under the Regulations. Courts handling such
suits are required to take judicial notice of the proscription if the
regulation is valid.90 However, it is clear that this regulation is
invalid under California Government Code Section 11374. This
section provides that any state agency regulations adopted to
implement the provisions of a statute will be found invalid where
they are not "reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
statute."'" The California Regulations were adopted by the DOA
to implement the directive in California Public Utilities Code Sec-
tion 21669 to establish standards for control of aircraft and air-
port noise. 2 There is little doubt that the proscription is not
necessary to achieve this purpose since it in no way relates to
aircraft and airport noise abatement standards. Therefore, courts
are required to invalidate this regulation. 3
Assuming the invalidity of the proscription, the desirability
of using the noise criteria in civil litigation must be determined.
Initially, it must be noted that if the Regulations are implemented
on schedule, by 1985 no residence in California will be affected
by airport noise levels greater than the level of normal conversation.
Clearly, this event would extinguish any further necessity for
inverse condemnation or nuisance actions over airport noise. Air-
port noise would no longer cause "takings" of property by sub-
stantially interfering with the property so as to diminish the
property's fair market value; nor would airport noise render
airport operations "unnecessary and injurious" and thereby en-
89 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5004 (1970).
90 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11384 (West 1966).
91 "Whenever by the express or implied terms of any statute a state agency has
authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise
carry out the provisions of the statute, no regulation adopted is valid or effective
unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute and reasonably necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the statute. . . ." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11374 (West 1953).
92 CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 21669 (West Supp. 1971); Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE
§ 5000 (1970).
98 Macomber v. State Social Welfare Bd., 175 Cal. App. 2d 614, 346 P.2d 808
(1959). The court here found that if, in adopting an administrative regulation under
the authority of an enabling statute, a state agency does not confine itself to a rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute, the legislative area has been invaded and courts
are obligated to strike down an administrative regulation which attempts to add or
subtract from the statute.
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joinable as a nuisance."' Until that day is reached, though, what
role can the Regulations' noise criteria play in civil litigation over
airport noise?
Unquestionably it would be desirable to have absolute stan-
dards for determining when interference from airport noise be-
comes so great as to cause a "taking" or create a nuisance. This
would preclude the necessity of courts having to consider the facts
of each case separately in order to determine whether a "taking"
or a nuisance exists. However, if the noise criteria were established
as guideposts for courts to use in making their determinations,
courts would be developing new rules of law irreconcilable with
present rules. An example will serve to illustrate this inevitable
conflict. In 1985, the criterion noise level under the Regulations
is 65 decibels, the level of normal conversation. If an inverse con-
demnation action were brought in 1985 in a court using the noise
criteria as its rule, the court would find a "taking" if the property
were affected by airport noise greater than 65 decibels. However, if
the action were brought in a court using the reduction in fair mar-
ket value rule, it is uncertain that the court will find a "taking"
on the same facts. In other words, merely because airport noise
levels exceed the level of normal conversation does not mean that
they will reduce the fair market value of property. Similarly, in
nuisance suits, merely because the noise from airport operations
exceeds the Regulations' noise criteria does not mean that those
operations are "unnecessary and injurious."
Thus, the Regulations' noise criteria should not be absolute
standards to apply in inverse condemnation or nuisance suits. Al-
though the DOA exceeded its authority in precluding use of the
noise criteria in civil litigation, courts should follow its approach.
Enforcement
A second problem, and indeed a major one, concerns the en-
forcement of the Regulations. The single event noise limits for
takeoffs and landings are to be enforced by levying a $1,000 fine
against individual aircraft operators each time they violate a take-
off or landing noise limit." The fine is both practical and effective.
Individual aircraft operators who violate the limits may be detected
with little difficulty for each takeoff and landing at a noise-problem
94 See notes 9-39 and accompanying text, supra.
95 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21669.4 (West Supp. 1971); Title 4, CAL. ADm. CODE
§ 5055 (1970). The latter provision states that prosecution will proceed under the
former provision.
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airport will be monitored." Furthermore, the fine will discourage
future violations.
While a fine for violations of the single event noise limits may
be effective, the method available to the DOA for enforcing the
operational noise level criteria is highly impractical. This method
consists of lifting the license of an airport violating the noise
criteria.9 Independent of the constitutional problems which might
exist,98 lifting the license of any large California airport is not prac-
tical. 9 Consequently, if the Regulations' operational noise criteria
are to be an effective means of airport noise abatement control, pro-
visions for their enforcement must be specifically defined and made
practical to implement.
Amending the Regulations by inserting provisions similar to
the enforcement sections in the California Water Quality Control
Act'00 provides a possible solution to the problem. This legislation
provides for certain regulations to prevent the pollution of Califor-
nia's waters by industry, cities, counties, governmental agencies,
or anyone else.'1 If these regulations are violated, the violator
is issued a cease and desist order0 2 and a cleanup and abatement
order.103 Upon failure to comply with either order, the superior
court of the county wherein the violator is located may issue a
preliminary or permanent injunction restraining the violator from
continuing the discharge in violation of the order."0 4 Furthermore,
upon failure to comply with a cleanup and abatement order, the
responsible governmental agency must abate the discharge and
hold the violator liable for the cost of the cleanup operation.'05 In
addition, violation of a cease and desist order subjects the violator
to a fine of up to $6,000 for each day in which such violation
occurs.' These enforcement techniques have been effectively em-
ployed to achieve compliance with the Water Quality Regulations. 07
906 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5030 (1970).
97 CAL. PUB. UTIr.. CODE § 21668 (West Supp. 1971).
98 See notes 171-76 and accompanying text, infra.
99 Telephone Interview with Sid McCausland, Consultant to the Committee on
Environmental Quality, California Assembly, Aug. 5, 1971.
100 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13020 et seq. (West 1971).
101 Id.
102 Id. § 13301.
103 Id. § 13304(a).
104 Id. §§ 13304(a), 13331.
105 Id. § 13304(b).
106 Id. § 13350(a).
107 "The case in which these regulations have been most effectively employed to
date concerned United States Steel as the polluter. After the issuance of a cease and
desist order and U.S. Steel's failure to comply therewith, the case was referred to the
California Attorney General's office for prosecution under the injunction and fine
provisions of the regulations. Prior to suit, U.S. Steel cleaned up their operation to
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The Water Quality Regulations and the California Noise Regu-
lations are similar in that they both seek to protect the environment
from pollutants. Therefore, it is reasonable to urge that legislation
such as the water enforcement provisions be implemented to en-
force the airport noise regulations. The new sections should pro-
vide for issuance of a noise abatement order by a county or the
DOA when an airport is found to be violating the operational noise
criteria. This order should require the airport proprietor to make
the necessary adjustments so that his airport may comply with the
Regulations. An affirmative injunction should also be available to
require an airport proprietor to comply with the abatement order.
If the airport proprietor fails to comply, the county within which
the airport is located should be required to take action to bring the
airport within the required noise levels with costs being charged to
the violator, the airport proprietor. Finally, an airport proprietor
should be subject to a fine of up to $6,000 for each day he fails to
take action pursuant to a noise abatement order. The following pro-
visions incorporate all of these suggestions:
(a) Upon failure of any airport proprietor to comply with any
noise abatement order issued by a county or the DOA, the Attorney
General, upon request of the county or DOA, shall petition the
superior court of the county wherein the airport is located for the
issuance of an affirmative injunction requiring such proprietor to
take available action to prevent continued violation of the noise
abatement order;
(b) Upon an airport proprietor's failure to take available action
to comply with a noise abatement order within a reasonable time,
the county within which the airport is located shall take the necessary
action and, by so doing, will acquire a lien on the airport property
payable by the airport proprietor, for the reasonable costs actually
incurred in abating the noise;
(c) In addition, any airport proprietor who intentionally or negli.
gently violates a noise abatement order may be civilly liable for a sum
not to exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000) for each day in which
such violation occurs;
(d) The Attorney General, upon request of the county wherein the
airport is located or the DOA, shall petition the superior court to
impose, assess, and recover such sums. In determining such amount,
the court shall take into consideration all relevant circumstances
including the extent of harm caused by the violation, the length
of time over which the violation occurs and corrective action, if
any, taken by the airport proprietor.
meet the requirements of the regulations and settled out-of-court for $15,000 due to
their failure to comply with the cease and desist order until 15 days had elapsed.
In addition to this case there are several others in which prosecutions by the Cali-
fornia Attorney General are presently pending." Telephone interview with Bill Ging-
ridge, Information Officer for the Regional Water Quality Control Board, Oakland,
California, Oct. 11, 1971.
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If adopted, these suggested provisions would provide the
practical means by which compliance with the operational noise
level criteria could be achieved. The affirmative injunction would
prevent the airport proprietor from violating the noise criteria by
requiring him to take available steps under the Regulations to bring
his airport into compliance. Furthermore, the fine would deter air-
port proprietors from violating the criteria. Finally and most im-
portantly, the requirement that the county abate the excessive noise
should the airport proprietor fail to act assures attainment of the
noise criteria.
Interested or Affected Persons
The final difficulty to be discussed deals with the lack of a
definition of "interested or affected persons" for purposes of filing for
a hearing under the appeals or variance procedures of the Regula-
tions. It is apparent that a person does not have to meet the legal
requirements of standing in order to file for an administrative hear-
ing and that it is within the discretion of the agency granting the
hearing to determine who is an "interested or affected person. 1 °8
However, at the present time, the DOA has no set criteria for
determining who is sufficiently interested to file for or request a
hearing under either the appeals or variance procedures. The DOA
has merely stated that it would question an application for a hearing
by persons not directly affected by the noise level of a particular
airport, such as a citizen action group interested in protecting the
environment from noise pollution. 109 In order to fill this void, the
DOA should revise the Regulations to provide a clear and concise
definition for "interested or affected persons." The following is
illustrative of such a definition:
Interested or affected persons, for purposes of these regulations,
shall include 1) all persons whose constitutional, statutory, or
common law rights would be adversely affected by DOA action, and
2) public action groups which have established their interest in
protecting the public from governmental action which is detri.
mental to the environment.
This definition would preclude persons whose only desire is to slow
down or thwart agency action from becoming involved in the appeals
or variance procedures. However, it would allow environmental
protection groups to question agency action where these groups have
established their concern for environmental protection. The DOA
108 Telephone interview with Dan Weston, Deputy Attorney General, State of
California, Aug. 11, 1971.
109 Telephone interview with Kieffer Parker, Deputy Director, Cal. Dep't of
Aeronautics, Aug. 3, 1971.
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should consider the requisite interest established when a group
proves that it is solely concerned with protecting the environment
and that it has expended, or is presently expending, large amounts
of time, money, and effort in pursuing environmental protection
activity." °
Summary
Proscribing the application of the noise criteria in civil liti-
gation arising out of airport noise exceeds the DOA's authority under
the enabling legislation."' Therefore, this provision should be deleted
from the Regulations. Additionally, existing enforcement methods
are impractical and should be replaced by the techniques used to
enforce the California Water Quality Control Act."' Finally, the
phrase "interested or affected persons" should be specifically defined
in the above-suggested manner so that it is clear who may become
involved in the appeals and variance procedures.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE REGULATIONS
While the substantive infirmities may be remedied by the vari-
ous proposals discussed, the Regulations are still subject to attack
on constitutional grounds. The Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution vests Congress with the power to regulate in-
terstate and foreign commerce." 3 The constitutional issues relating
to the California Regulations concern whether the Regulations are
pre-empted by federal law regulating interstate flight and whether
the Regulations unduly burden interstate commerce.
A. Federal Pre-emption
Generally, states may act on a subject: 1) if it is one of local
interest and concern and in an area not requiring national uni-
formity;.. 4 2) if Congress has not acted regarding it;" 5 or 3) if
110 The court in Citizens Committee v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970), found such an interest sufficient to merit standing to sue.
Thus, if it is sufficient to obtain standing to sue, it is certainly sufficient to become
involved in the appeals or variance procedures of the California Regulations. The
court granted standing to an ad hoc environmental protection group, because it had
displayed a sufficient interest in protecting the environment as evidenced by the con-
siderable expense and effort undertaken by the group to protect the environment.
425 F.2d at 103. For an in-depth look at the problem of establishing a sufficient
interest for standing purposes see Comment, Standing and Sovereign Immunity:
Hurdles for Environmental Litigants, 12 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 122 (1971).
111 See notes 89-93 and accompanying text, supra.
112 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13020 et seq., 13301, 13304, 13331, 13350 (West 1971).
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
114 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946).
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Congress has acted but has not obtained exclusive jurisdiction over
the field, 16 provided the state law would not conflict with the federal
law. 117
1. Local Interest Absent Need for National Uniformity
The California Regulations were adopted with the valid interest
and intent of protecting community peace and property rights by
protecting California communities from excessive airport noise." S
In addition, there has been no indication by Congress or the courts
that airport noise regulation is a subject requiring national uni-
formity. Therefore, the California Regulations cannot be pre-empted
on this ground. However, the fact that Congress has acted in the
fields of aircraft flight and noise control necessitates examination
of the extent of such action to determine whether the California
Regulations conflict with federal law or whether they deal in an area
of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
2. Congressional Action in the Field of Airport Noise
Regulation
The federal laws relating to airport noise which are pertinent to
this discussion11 are the Federal Aviation Act of 1958120 and its 1968
noise amendment. 2 ' The 1958 Act was enacted for the purpose of
providing safety factors for interstate flight. Pursuant to the Act,
specific regulations were adopted which govern the following: desig-
nation of federal airways, 22 establishment of jet routes, 23 objects
affecting navigable airspace,2 general operating and flight rules
which include minimum safe altitudes and operations at airports, 2 '
115 California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 113 (1941).
110 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728-31 (1949).
117 Kelley v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937).
118 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5000 (1970) ; see note 69, supra.
119 There is one federal law not discussed in the text because it relates only
indirectly to the issues discussed therein. This federal law is the Airport and Airway
Development Act §§ 11-27, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711-27 (Supp. 1970), which governs the
expansion of airports when such expansion is funded entirely or partially by federal
funds. The act states that before expansion will be approved, environmental studies
of the expansion must be performed. According to the Federal Aviation Agency's
interpretation (FAA Order No. 5050.2), prior to approval sponsors of the expansion
must perform environmental impact studies and submit an impact statement pur-
suant to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act §§ 2 et seq.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321 et seq. (Supp. 1971), whenever such expansion is likely to be
highly controversial on environmental grounds because it is likely to noticeably affect
the ambient noise level for a significant number of people.
120 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301 et seq. (1963).
121 49 U.S.C.A. § 1431(a) (Supp. 1971).
122 14 C.F.R. §§ 71.1-.19 (1971).
123 14 C.F.R. §§ 75.1-.17 (1971).
124 14 C.F.R. §§ 77.1-.75 (1971).
125 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.1-.175 (1971).
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special air traffic rules and airport traffic patterns for certain speci-
fied airports," 6 instrument flight rule altitudes,
12 7 and standard in-
strument approach procedures.12
8 These regulations were not intended
to establish controls of airport noise levels and only indirectly affect
such levels by controlling the altitudes at which aircraft land and
take off.
The 1968 noise amendment deals with aircraft noise control.
This amendment directs the administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration to prescribe and amend rules and regulations "to
provide for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic
boom.' 29 Pursuant to this directive, the Federal Aviation Agency
added noise standards for aircraft certification to the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations.'30 These are not standards for the control of op-
erational noise levels at airports, but are requirements which all new
jet aircraft must meet before they will be licensed to fly in interstate
commerce.
131
Given the extent of federal regulation in the field of airport
noise control, the question becomes: Has the federal government
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the field, and if not, do the
California Regulations conflict with federal law?
3. Absent Conflict, Federal Law Must Possess Exclusive
Jurisdiction to Pre-empt State Law
It is clear that states and localities, in their legislative capaci-
ties, may not pass legislation in direct conflict with federal Regu-
lations. 132 The California Regulations create no conflict with federal
law for the Regulations specifically prohibit such an occurence."'
Therefore, the discussion must proceed with an analysis of federal
jurisdiction over airport noise regulation.
The federal noise legislation of 1968 and the standards adopted
pursuant thereto deal with aircraft noise and were not intended to
pre-empt the field of airport noise regulation. This federal legislation
specifically exempts airport proprietors from federal 
jurisdictionY.3 4
126 14 C.F.R. §§ 93.1-.133 (1971).
127 14 C.F.R. §§ 95.1-.8001 (1971).
128 14 C.F.R. §§ 97.1-.20 (1971).
129 49 U.S.C.A. § 1431(a) (Supp. 1971).
130 14 C.F.R. §§ 36.1-.1581 (1971) (appendix C).
131 For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the federal noise standards for
type-certification see Berger, Nobody Loves An Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 
631, 763-
774 (1970); Larsen, Improving The Airport Environment: Effect of the 1969 FAA
Regulations on Noise, 55 IowA L. REV. 808 (1970).
132 American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y.
1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
133 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5004 (1970).
134 See notes 135-37 and accompanying text, infra.
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a. The Power of An Airport Proprietor to Act Independently
of Federal Noise Law. As the owner of an airport, the proprietor
has the right to regulate in the area of airport noise abatement
independently of federal noise standards dealing with aircraft-type
certification.1 5 The Senate, in passing the 1968 noise amendment
which authorized the noise standards for type certification, clarified
the basis of this exception:
However, the proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State
or local public agency, as proprietor of an airport, from issuing regula-
tions or establishing requirements as to the permissible level of noise
which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport owners
acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their airport to
aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion
is non-discriminatory 
.... In dealing with this issue, the Federal Gov-
ernment should not substitute its judgement for that of the States or
elements of local government who, for the most part, own and operate
our Nation's airports.' 36
Furthermore, in adopting the noise standards for type certification
pursuant to the mandate under the 1968 amendment, the Federal
Aviation Agency also noted that the noise standards were not meant
to inhibit the power of the airport proprietor to regulate in the area
of noise abatement.13 7
The DOA recognized that this caveat allows airport proprietors
to regulate independently of federal law in the area of airport noise
control and that there is no federal or state law prohibiting a state
agency from issuing noise regulations directed at airport propri-
etors.' Cognizant of this, the DOA, acting in its capacity as the
135 See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), where a county, asproprietor of an airport, was held liable for an unconstitutional "taking" of property
resulting from interference with the property by airport operations. Recognizing thatthis case established the responsibility of the airport proprietor to take whatever
action necessary to prevent "takings" of property by his airport, the federal govern-
ment has specifically not pre-empted the field of airport noise regulation by airportproprietors. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2694 (1968).
136 S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2694 (1968).
137 "The noise limits specified in Part 36 are the technologically practicable and
economically reasonable limits of airport noise reduction technology at the time oftype certification and are not intended to substitute federally determined noise levelsfor those more restrictive limits determined to be necessary by individual airportproprietors in response to the locally determined desire for quiet and the locally
determined need for the benefits of air commerce. This limitation on the scope ofPart 36 is required for consistency with the responsibilities placed upon the airportproprietor by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84(1962). Consistent with this limited scope, this amendment specifies that the FederalAviation Administration makes no determination, under Part 36, on the acceptability
of the prescribed noise levels in any specific airport environment . . . ." 34 Fed. Reg.
18355-56 (1969). See also 14 C.F.R. § 36.201 (1971).
138 In fact, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently indicated that
state legislation, requiring airport proprietors to exercise their power of noise control,
licensing agency for all California airports,
139 adopted the Regula-
tions which direct airport proprietors to set maximum noise levels
allowable for aircraft landings and takeoffs,
14 ° and to employ a series
of other methods to bring the operational noise level of their airports
within the required level. 4' Courts have considered various methods
used by different airports to achieve noise abatement.'
42 Most of
these methods are specified in or contemplated by the California
Regulations. The following have been validated by the courts as
being within an airport's power to regulate independently of federal
noise legislation: 1) Utilizing runways to achieve maximum noise
abatement; 143 2) Employing shielding through use of sound baffling
devices 44 or portable shields;' 3) Reducing flight frequency during
the most noise sensitive time periods;
4
' and 4) Encouraging air-
craft operators to use noise suppression devices on their engines.
47
The last approved method is not specified in the Regulations as
being available to the airport proprietor. Nevertheless, in preparing
such a list, the DOA stated that the available methods included
but were not limited to the ones enumerated.
4 Thus, it is conceiv-
able that airport proprietors could encourage the use of noise sup-
pression devices in addition to utilizing the specified methods. The
fact that the noise criteria under the Regulations are meant to gov-
should be validated. Advisory Opinion on Senate Bill No. 1161, 40 U.S.L.W. 2029
(Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. June 25, 1971). The court made this suggestion in an advisory
opinion addressed to the Massachusetts Legislature regarding the validity of a pro-
posed Massachusetts law designed to regulate sonic boom at all Massachusetts air-
ports. The Court found that the legislation exceeded the area which could still 
be
subject to state regulation because the bill was not directed to the airport proprietors'
powers over airport noise control. The California Regulations, to the contrary, are
explicit in directing themselves to individual airport proprietors.
139 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21662 (West Supp. 1971).
140 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5035 (1970); see also CAL. PUB. Urn.. CODE
§ 21669 (West Supp. 1971).
141 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5011 (1970).
142 Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 108 N.J. Super.
461, 261 A.2d 692 (1969).
143 Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745,
751-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
144 . . . "g) There shall also be required noise suppression devices and noise at-
tenuation equipment or engine 'test cells' to be installed and used for jet engine
maintenance and testing, or in the alternative, the construction and use of facilities
acoustically designed for noise attenuation .. . to muffle ground run-up noise during
repair and maintenance; .. . 1) Portable shields or sound baffling devices [are re-
quired at the end of runways]; j) Jet aircraft will be prohibited from take-off or
landing except during specified hours, unless an emergency exists . . . . Township of
Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 108 N.J. Super. 461, 477, 261 A.2d 692, 708 (1969).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Title 4, CAL. ADM . CODE § 5011 (1970).
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ern the "operation of aircraft and aircraft engines 1 49 at California
airports makes this not only conceivable but probable.
In addition to the approved methods mentioned above, theRegulations provide that the airport proprietor may encourage ap-proach and departure flight paths and procedures to minimize the
noise in residential areas 5o and set noise limits for aircraft landings
and takeoffs.' Unlike the methods of noise abatement enumerated
above, these two additional methods have, to date, not been consid-
ered by the courts. These methods deal with flight path control for
noise abatement purposes and, therefore, should be valid only iffederal regulation of flight does not possess exclusive jurisdiction
over this field.
b. The Power of an Airport Proprietor to Act Independently
of Federal Flight Path Regulation. Congress has not explicitly
excepted the airport proprietor from federal jurisdiction over flightpaths. Therefore, if he has any power in this field, it must bederived from the cases which have considered the authority of states
or localities to regulate flight for noise abatement purposes.
In Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst,52 the UnitedStates Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held that a local
ordinance, prescribing a minimum altitude of 1000 feet for flights
over the locality, was unconstitutional on the grounds that the fed-
eral government had pre-empted the field of aircraft flight regula-tion. 53 However, the local ordinance considered by the court inCedarhurst was in actual conflict with federal statutes and regula-tion."" Consequently, the Supreme Court of California in LomaPortal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc.,155 concluded that thepre-emption language used in Cedarhurst should not be conclusive
as to the validity of state regulation of flight for noise abatementpurposes where the regulation does not conflict with federal flight
rules. 5" In Loma Portal, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin a public
airport's operations on the basis of noise considerations.'57 Defen-dants urged that an injunction should be refused since federal lawpre-empts all aspects of flight operation. 5 ' In denying this conten-tion, the California Supreme Court held that state legislation could
149 Id. § 5000.
150 Id. § 5011.
151 Id. § 5035.
152 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
153 Id. at 815.
154 Id. at 814.
155 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).156 Id. at 590-93, 394 P.2d at 554-55, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
157 Id. at 585-86, 394 P.2d at 550-57, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 710-11.
158 Id. at 591, 394 P.2d at 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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not be pre-empted by federal law in the absence of a clear holding
by the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress that federal jurisdiction
had been made exclusive. 59 There is no U.S. Supreme Court case
holding that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is to be the exclusive
law dealing with the regulation of aircraft flight for noise abatement
purposes. On the contrary, the Loma Portal court noted that the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, by its own terms, was not intended to
be exclusive: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies."' 60
In support of this position, the court cited a U.S. Supreme Court
case, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.'6' The Court
upheld a city's application of its antismoke ordinance to a ship in
international commerce although the vessel's boiler was built in com-
pliance with federal requirements and had received federal approval
after inspection.'62 It was held that exclusive federal jurisdiction
did not automatically follow from the fact that the ship was licensed
under federal law.'63 Following this exact reasoning, the court in
Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown'64 reached the follow-
ing conclusion regarding the exclusiveness of federal law in the area
of airport noise regulation:
[T]he fact that planes are licensed and operating within a zone defined
by Congress as "navigable airspace" should not immunize them from
[noise] regulations evincing a valid local interest in maintaining com-
munity peace or protecting property rights.' 65
Nevertheless, a federal district court in Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.
v. City of Burbank,'66 recently held, consistent with the holding in
Cedarhurst, that the United States possesses exclusive jurisdiction
in the field of aircraft flight regulation for noise abatement purposes
and that federal law pre-empts this field.' 7 This court, however,
failed to distinguish the contrary holdings of the courts in Loma
Portal and Morristown. Furthermore, the evidence'6 8 presented in
support of the position of the Burbank court is weak. This evidence
159 Id.
160 Id. at 592-93, 394 P.2d at 555, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 715. See also 49 U.S.C. § 1506
(1959).
161 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 448.
164 108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (1969).
165 Id. at 470, 261 A.2d at 701.
166 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 925.
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consisted of a Senate Report which had stated that courts had held
the Federal Government presently pre-empted the field of noise
regulation in so far as it involved controlling the flight of aircraft.1"9
However, the Burbank court failed to note that the Senate Report
also revealed that the courts so holding were dealing with local
legislation in actual conflict with federal flight regulations.170 There-
fore, the holding of Burbank should not be accepted as conclusive
of pre-emption in cases where the state or local legislation is not in
conflict with federal law.
This case law illustrates that there is, at present, no conclusive
answer as to whether state regulation of flight for noise abatement
purposes is pre-empted by non-conflicting federal regulations. Ac-
cording to the cases, pre-emption should result in this situation
where federal jurisdiction is exclusive. However, the courts disagree
on whether federal flight regulation is exclusive in the field of flight
regulation for noise abatement purposes. The Cedarhurst and Bur-
bank courts found that there is exclusive jurisdiction due to the
extensive federal regulation of flight in this field, whereas the Loma
Portal and Morristown courts held that extensive regulation of
flight by federal legislation does not preclude state regulation where
it does not conflict with federal law and where it displays an interest
in protecting community peace or property.
Considering the substantial need for control of airport noise
pollution and the failure of the federal government to provide such
noise control regulation, public policy dictates that the Loma Portal
and Morristown cases present the better view. Based on the analysis
of these cases, the flight control provisions of the California Regu-
lations should not be invalidated by a claim that they invade an area
of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
B. Undue Burden 7'
Another constitutional consideration is whether enforcement
of the Regulations by lifting the license of an airport would unrea-
sonably burden interstate commerce. In Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc. 72 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that a state law will not
unduly burden interstate commerce if the total effect of the law is
so slight and problematical as not to outweigh the national interest
in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seri-
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1925). The Supreme Court here
stated the generally recognized principle that state regulation will be invalidated where
it unduly burdens interstate commerce.
172 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
[Vol. 12
ously impede it.178 There are no exact guidelines for determining
when interstate commerce will be "seriously impeded." However,
there is little question that lifting an airport license would be an
undue burden. Lifting an airport license would require total cessa-
tion of interstate flight to or from that airport. This would mean that
people would be prevented from reaching their intended destinations.
Thus, the effect of this technique on interstate commerce is not slight
or problematical but serious and, therefore, unconstitutional.
If the Regulations were amended to provide for enforcement
of the noise criteria by the injunction and fine previously sug-
gested,'174 there should be no constitutional problems with enforce-
ment. Neither the affirmative injunction nor fine would unduly bur-
den interstate commerce for neither would require the cessation of
interstate flight. These techniques would merely compel airport
proprietors to take permissible steps under the Regulations to bring
their airports into compliance with the noise criteria.'
75 All of the
procedures available to the airport proprietor have been held not
to unreasonably burden interstate commerce except the approach
and the single event noise limit control procedures.
176 The latter two
have not been considered by the courts. However, there is little
question that these procedures do not unduly burden interstate
commerce for they do not inhibit interstate flight in any manner.
The final constitutional issue relates to the cost of implementing
the monitoring equipment under the Regulations and whether that
cost creates an undue burden on interstate commerce. In Bibb the
U.S. Supreme Court found that the cost of complying with an Illinois
motor safety statute was not unreasonably burdensome of interstate
commerce.'
77 The cost of compliance was estimated to be $45,840.178
Concerning this issue of cost, the Court stated:
Cost taken into consideration with other factors might be relevant in
some cases to the issue of burden on interstate commerce. But it has
assumed no such proportions here. If we had here only a question of
whether the cost of adjusting an interstate operation to these new local
safety regulations prescribed by Illinois unduly burdened interstate
commerce, we would have to sustain the law .... 179
The Supreme Court followed the same reasoning in the case of
173 Id. at 524.
174 See notes 100-07 and accompanying text, supra.
175 Title 4, CAL. ADm. CODE § 5011 (1970).
176 See notes 135-51 and accompanying text, supra.
177 359 U.S. at 526.
178 Id. at 525.
179 Id. at 526.
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Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. &P.R. Co.' 8 0 The Court sustained a state
railroad safety regulation which cost an estimated $7,600,000 per
year.' 8 ' The cost of implementing the monitoring equipment under
the Regulations does not even approach the cost of compliance with
the state law in the above case. 82 Therefore, the cost of the
monitoring equipment should not be found to unduly burden inter-
state commerce.
C. Summary
Apparently, the Regulations are constitutional in all respects
except for the license-lifting method of enforcement. However, as-
suming that this method is declared unconstitutional, this will not
affect the validity of the remaining provisions for the Regulations
contain a severability clause to this effect. 8 ' Furthermore, amend-ing the Regulations to provide for enforcement by the previously
suggested injunction and fine procedure' would divest the Regula-
tions of any constitutional problems.
CONCLUSION
The California Airport Noise Regulations represent the great-
est hope yet to people living within the vicinity of an airport in
their quest for a quiet environment. The Regulations require that
airport noise levels be progressively reduced to a level no greater
than that of normal conversation. By offering an effective noise
control system for meeting this goal, the California Regulations con-
stitute the strongest potential assault on the number one problem
with airports today-noise.
I. Timothy Doyle
180 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
181 Id. at 139 n.12.
182 "The cost of the monitoring equipment under the California Regulations
could range from $9,000 plus the cost of 200 hours per year for personnel to operatethe equipment to $175,000 plus the cost of full time personnel depending on the size
of the particular airport and the degree of the noise problem at that airport."Telephone interview with Richard Dyer, Program Manager for Noise Level Control,
Cal. Dep't of Aeronautics, Aug. 15, 1971.
183 Title 4, CAL. ADM. CODE § 5002 (1970).
184 See notes 100-07 and accompanying text, supra.
